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I. INTRODUCTION
As a female college student is exiting her car, a masked adult
male runs toward her, points a gun, and instructs her to hand over
her money and property.1 He then orders her to get into the passenger seat of her own car, which he drives off in pursuit of another vehicle.2 After the two cars come to a stop, an armed sixteen-year-old
male enters the victim’s vehicle; both males are pointing their guns
at the female victim.3 The sixteen-year-old orders the victim out of
the car and continues to hold her at gunpoint while he and his accomplice take turns raping her.4 They then force her to the trunk and
rape her again.5 The brutality continues as the sixteen-year-old
throws the victim onto the ground and, while still holding her at
gunpoint, the two males take turns repeatedly raping her.6 The sixteen-year-old is convicted as an adult of numerous offenses and is
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling eighty-nine
years.7 He challenges the constitutionality of his sentence pursuant
to Graham v. Florida.8
In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the imposition
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.9 The holding was motivated by the Court’s recognition
that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults because the
characteristics of youth render them less morally culpable.10 Thus,
juveniles are less deserving of the second-harshest punishment of life
without parole, which impermissibly leaves them without hope of release upon demonstrated reform.11 Accordingly, states are required to
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”12 While states must provide juveniles with “some realistic opportunity to obtain release,” they “need not guarantee [juvenile]
offender[s’] eventual release” from prison.13
The Graham opinion has led to an abundance of uncertainty and
litigation; indeed, courts and legislatures are struggling to resolve
several significant issues. This Note examines whether it is unconsti1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2017-18, 2034 (2010).
See id. at 2026-27.
See id.
Id. at 2030.
Id. at 2034.

2013]

“MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY” FOR RELEASE

1029

tutional pursuant to Graham to impose a lengthy term-of-yearswithout-parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, such as
the eighty-nine-year sentence on the juvenile rapist described above.
To properly resolve Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences
and the attendant line-drawing problems, it is necessary to address what constitutes the requisite “meaningful opportunity” to
obtain release.
Accordingly, Part II provides a general overview of the Eighth
Amendment, a thorough review of the Supreme Court’s precedent
establishing that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults,
and an introduction to the issues discussed in this Note. Part III provides a comprehensive description of how courts across the nation
have resolved Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences and
offers a critique of the present approaches. Part IV examines what
the Court’s mandate to provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation”14
entails and presents the proper approach to Graham’s applicability to
term-of-years sentences. Part IV also describes Florida’s unsuccessful
legislative efforts to comply with Graham’s mandate and provides
guidance for future efforts. Part V offers concluding remarks.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT ESPECIALLY PROTECTS JUVENILES
Section A provides a general overview of the punishments the
Eighth Amendment prohibits, the purposes of the Amendment, and
the Supreme Court’s approaches to Eighth Amendment challenges.
Section B provides a thorough analysis of Roper v. Simmons and
Graham v. Florida—the Court’s cases establishing that juvenile offenders are constitutionally different from adults and must receive
special Eighth Amendment protection. Lastly, Section C introduces
the significant issues that arise from Graham and lie at the heart of
this Note.
A. The Eighth Amendment: Prohibitions, Purposes, and Analyses
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution pronounces that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”15 The
Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment16 and prohibits “ ‘all excessive punishments, as
14. Id. at 2030.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
16. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008). Kennedy held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments proscribe the imposition of the death penalty for child rape. Id. at
421. The Court concluded that “there is a distinction between intentional first-degree
murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individual persons, even
including child rape, on the other” because nonhomicide crimes “cannot be compared to

1030

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1027

well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not
be excessive.’ ”17
The Eighth Amendment proscriptions are premised on the “basic
‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense.’ ”18 While this proportionality principle “is central to the Eighth Amendment,”19 it is “a ‘narrow proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences
that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.’ ”20 Moreover, the
Amendment encompasses “the essential principle that . . . the State
must respect the human attributes even of those who have committed serious crimes.”21 Accordingly, the prohibitions serve to protect
“the dignity of man” and ensure that the government exercises its
power to punish “within the limits of civilized standards.”22
To determine what sentences comply with the civilized standards
and are thus not excessive or cruel and unusual, “[t]he Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”23 Consequently, whether
the Eighth Amendment prohibits a punishment depends not on the
standards that prevailed when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but on
the standards that “currently prevail.”24 The Court’s precedent concerning sentence proportionality “fall[s] within two general classifications”: “challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences” and “categorical restrictions on the death penalty.”25 In a case involving a

murder in their ‘severity and irrevocability.’ ” Id. at 438 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion)). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240
(1972) (per curiam); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
17. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 419 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 n.7
(2002)).
18. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
19. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
20. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1000-01 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)); see also Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003) (upholding a prison sentence of twenty-five years to life for felony
grand theft pursuant to a three-strikes law because the Eighth Amendment’s narrow
proportionality principle prohibits only “grossly disproportionate” sentences). The Court in
Ewing also noted that the proportionality principle applies in the noncapital context. Id. at
23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)).
21. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
22. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
23. Id. at 101; id. at 100-01 (noting “that the words of the Amendment are not precise,
and that their scope is not static”); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (noting the
standard for determining what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment remains the
same, but its applicability changes with society’s morals (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at
419)).
24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
25. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
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challenge to a term-of-years sentence, “the Court considers all the
circumstances” of the particular case.26 Specifically,
[a] court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and
the severity of the sentence. “[I]n the rare case in which [this]
threshold comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the court should then compare the defendant's sentence
with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial
judgment that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is cruel and unusual.27

On the other hand, a categorical challenge has historically involved
the death penalty (at least before Graham v. Florida) and turns on
either the nature of the offense or the characteristics of the offender.28 In such a case,
[t]he Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards,
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine whether there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Next, guided by “the standards elaborated by
controlling precedents and by the Court's own understanding and
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's text, history, meaning,
and purpose,” the Court must determine in the exercise of its own
independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates the Constitution.29

In Graham v. Florida, for the first time the Court faced “a categorical
challenge to a term-of-years sentence”; because the case “implicate[d]
a particular type of sentence as it applie[d] to an entire class of of26. Id.
27. Id. at 2022 (citations omitted) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). As the Graham
Court noted, cases in the terms-of-years category include Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11
(2003) (upholding a prison sentence of twenty-five years to life for the grand theft of golf
clubs pursuant to a three-strikes law); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957 (upholding a life without
parole sentence for possession of a large quantity of cocaine); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277
(1983) (holding unconstitutional a life without parole sentence for a seventh nonviolent
felony, passing a worthless check); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371 (1982) (per curiam)
(upholding a forty-year prison sentence for “possession [of marijuana] with intent to
distribute and distribution of mari[j]uana”); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980)
(upholding a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a third nonviolent felony
offense, obtaining money by false pretenses). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
28. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
29. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005);
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 408 (2008)). As the Graham Court noted, cases
involving a categorical challenge include Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407 (holding unconstitutional
the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes); Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (holding unconstitutional
the death penalty for offenders who are under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime);
Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (holding unconstitutional the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (same); and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (same). Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
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fenders who [had] committed a range of crimes,” the Court applied
the categorical analysis.30
B. Juveniles Are Constitutionally Different From Adults
1. Roper v. Simmons
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the “imposition of the death
penalty on offenders who were under the age of [eighteen]” at the
time of their crime.31 Applying the categorical approach, the Court
first concluded that the objective indicia of society’s standards
demonstrate a consensus against the death penalty for juveniles.32
Specifically, the Court observed that the majority of states do not allow the imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, states that do
allow it rarely impose it, and there has been a trend toward abolishing the practice.33
Next, the Court exercised its independent judgment and determined that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for
juveniles in light of relevant precedent and the special characteristics
of youth.34 Precedent has established that because “the death penalty
is the most severe punishment,”35 it “must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and
whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ ”36 Juveniles are not “among the worst offenders,” as illustrated
by three chief differences between juveniles and adults.37 The first
difference, demonstrated by experience and scientific and sociological
studies, is that “ ‘[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young. These qualities often result
in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.’ ”38 Second,
“juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences

30. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23 (reasoning that comparison of the punishment’s
severity with the crime’s gravity would be fruitless because the challenge does not involve
a particular defendant’s sentence, but a whole sentencing practice).
31. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
32. See id. at 564, 567.
33. Id. at 567. The Court noted that “ ‘[i]t is not so much the number of these States
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.’ ” Id. at 566 (quoting
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).
34. Id. at 564, 568-70, 575.
35. Id. at 568 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 856 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
36. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
37. Id. at 569.
38. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”39 Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”40 As such, “it
is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed
by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character . . . , for
a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will
be reformed.”41 These manifest differences reveal that juveniles possess diminished culpability for their crimes.42
Consequently, juvenile death sentences do not fully serve retributive and deterrence purposes, which are the two penological justifications for the penalty.43 “Retribution is not proportional if the law’s
most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth
and immaturity.”44 Moreover, “the absence of evidence of deterrent
effect is of special concern because the same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence.”45
The Court recognized that drawing the line at the age of eighteen
is both under- and over-inclusive, but reasoned that “a line must be
drawn,” and “[t]he age of [eighteen] is the point where society draws
the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood.”46 Lastly, the Court consulted foreign and international law to instruct and
support, but not control, its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.47 In doing so, the Court concluded that “the United States now
[stood] alone in a world that ha[d] turned its face against the juvenile
death penalty.”48

39. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); see also Eddings, 455
U.S. at 115 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life
when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.”).
40. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
41. Id. at 570; see also id. at 573 (noting even psychologists have difficulty
differentiating between “transient immaturity” and “irreparable corruption”).
42. Id. at 561 (noting that “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the
privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is
not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult” (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 835 (1988))).
43. Id. at 571-72 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).
44. Id. at 571.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 574 (concluding that the Court’s logic behind prohibiting the death penalty
for juveniles under the age of sixteen in Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, extends to juveniles
under eighteen).
47. Id. at 575-78; id. at 578 (“It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights
within our own heritage of freedom.”).
48. Id. at 577.
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2. Graham v. Florida
Terrance Graham was sentenced to life imprisonment for armed
burglary and fifteen years imprisonment for attempted armed robbery following a conviction for violation of probation.49 Because Florida had abolished its parole system, Graham had no possibility of release, save for executive clemency.50 Graham was under the age of
eighteen at the time of his offenses.51 The issue before the Supreme
Court was “whether the Constitution permits a juvenile offender to
be sentenced to life in prison without parole for a nonhomicide
crime.”52 The Court analyzed the Eighth Amendment issue pursuant
to the categorical approach53 and answered it in the negative.54
The Court first examined the objective indicia of national consensus and found that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government permit life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; however, the actual imposition of the
sentence is so infrequent that it demonstrates “a consensus against
its use.”55 Next, the Court scrutinized the constitutionality of the sen-

49. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2018. Graham was sixteen years old when he committed the armed burglary
with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery. Id. He pled guilty and begged the
court for a second chance, promising to turn his life around. Id. The court withheld
adjudication and sentenced him to three years of probation on each count, to run
concurrently, with the first twelve months to be served in jail. Id. Less than six months
after his release from jail, and about a month shy of his eighteenth birthday, Graham was
arrested for home invasion robbery and attempted robbery following a high-speed chase.
Id. at 2018-19. The police also found three handguns in his vehicle. Id. at 2019. Graham
admitted to police that he had been involved in two or three robberies aside from the two
robberies on the night in question. Id. In court, Graham denied his involvement in the
home invasion robbery but admitted violating his probation by fleeing from police. Id. The
court found that Graham violated his probation by attempting to avoid arrest, committing
home invasion robbery, possessing a firearm, and “associating with persons engaged in
criminal activity.” Id. Under Florida law, Graham faced a minimum of five years
imprisonment without a downward departure, and a maximum of life imprisonment. Id.
The defense attorney requested five years; the Florida Department of Corrections
recommended at most four years; and the State recommended thirty years for the armed
burglary and fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery. Id. The trial court judge
explained that he did not understand how Graham “would be given such a great
opportunity to do something with [his] life” but would rather “throw it away.” Id. His
criminal behavior was escalating; because he could not be helped onto the right path, the
court had to focus on the community’s safety. Id. at 2019-20.
52. Id. at 2017-18.
53. Id. at 2022-23. The Court was faced with “a categorical challenge to a term-ofyears sentence” for the first time and concluded that only the categorical approach was
appropriate because “a sentencing practice itself is in question.” Id. at 2022. The challenge
“implicate[d] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who
have committed a range of crimes”; thus, comparing the gravity of the crime to the severity
of the sentence was unhelpful. Id. at 2022-23.
54. See id. at 2034.
55. Id. at 2023. Six jurisdictions prohibit life-without-parole sentences for all juvenile
offenders, and an additional seven jurisdictions prohibit the sentence for juvenile
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tence pursuant to its own independent judgment.56 The Court began
by examining the culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders and
concluded that “compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender
who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each bear
on the analysis.”57
As to age, the Court reaffirmed Roper’s premise that “juveniles
have lessened culpability” than adults because they “have a ‘lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility’; they ‘are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure’; and their characters are ‘not as
well formed.’ ”58 Indeed, psychology and brain science demonstrate
that the parts of the brain that control behavior continue to develop
through late adolescence.59 Because juveniles are less morally culpable and more amenable to change, “they are less deserving of the
most severe punishments.”60
As for the nature of the offense, the Court had “recognized that
defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be
taken are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of
punishment than are murderers.”61 “[L]ife without parole is ‘the second most severe’ ”62 sentence and, unlike any other, it has the following characteristics in common with the death penalty:
[T]he sentence alters the offender's life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence. . . . [T]his sentence “means denial of hope; it
means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for
the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the
rest of his days.”63

Therefore,
Life without parole is an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile. Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on average serve
nonhomicide offenders. Id. However, only 123 juvenile nonhomicide offenders are serving
life-without-parole sentences—77 in Florida and 46 across ten states. Id. at 2024.
56. Id. at 2026.
57. Id. at 2027.
58. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
61. Id. at 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Tison v. Arizona,
481 U.S. 137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977)).
62. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
63. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
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more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an
adult offender. A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to
life without parole receive the same punishment in name only. . . .
This reality cannot be ignored.64

The Court next considered legitimate penological goals and concluded that none justify a sentence of life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, thereby rendering the sentence disproportionate to the offense.65 Retribution does not justify the second-mostsevere sentence for an offender whose moral culpability is twice diminished for at “ ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal offender.’ ”66 Moreover, “ ‘the same characteristics that
render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest . . . that juveniles
will be less susceptible to deterrence.’ ”67 Regardless, “any limited
deterrent effect” would not justify the sentence for it is grossly disproportionate “in light of juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished
moral responsibility.”68 Incapacitation is likewise an insufficient justification because courts cannot reliably determine at the outset that
a juvenile is incapable of rehabilitation.69 “A life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”70 Lastly,
[t]he penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. By
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person's value
and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a
juvenile nonhomicide offender's capacity for change and limited
moral culpability. A State's rejection of rehabilitation, moreover,
goes beyond a mere expressive judgment. . . . [D]efendants serving
life without parole sentences are often denied access to vocational
training and other rehabilitative services that are available to other inmates. For juvenile offenders, who are most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation, the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the sentence all
the more evident.71

Therefore, the Court held, the Eighth Amendment bars lifewithout-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.72 The
Court clarified the scope of this prohibition:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 2028 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
Id. at 2028-30.
Id. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571).
Id. at 2029.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2030 (citations omitted).
Id.
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A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile
offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must
do, however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation. It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore
the means and mechanisms for compliance. . . . The Eighth
Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain
behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to
reenter society.73

Thus, if the State imposes a life sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide
offender, it must provide the juvenile “with some realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”74 Lastly, the Court’s
holding was supported, although not controlled, by the global consensus that exists against the imposition of life without parole sentences
on juvenile nonhomicide offenders; indeed, the United States was the
only nation that actually imposed the sentence.75
C. Complying With Graham v. Florida: Unresolved Issues
The Graham opinion raises a multitude of issues, including the
following two interrelated matters that remain unresolved.76 The first
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2034.
75. Id. at 2033-34 (noting that eleven nations authorize life-without-parole sentences
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, but only the United States imposes it).
76. Additionally, the Graham holding was limited to juvenile nonhomicide offenders,
leaving open the question of whether the Eighth Amendment bars life-without-parole
sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. In Miller v. Alabama, the Court avoided this
issue by concluding that it was the sentencing schemes mandating life without parole that
made the juvenile homicide offenders’ life without parole sentences unconstitutional. 132 S.
Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). Indeed, the Court expressly retained the possibility of life-withoutparole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. Id. Notably though, the Court opined that
the sentence would rarely be appropriate. Id. This comment, coupled with the Roper,
Graham, and Miller holdings, may very well signal the Court’s willingness to extend
Graham to juvenile homicide offenders—a conclusion that did not go undrawn by the
Miller dissenters. See id. at 2489-90 (Alito, J., dissenting). Moreover, even though Graham
emphasized the twice-diminished culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the Court
must deem unconstitutional life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders in
order to remain true to the principle that juveniles are constitutionally different from
adults. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27. This point is illustrated by the Graham
dissenters:
[I]n the end, the Court does not even believe its pronouncements about the
juvenile mind. If it did, the categorical rule it announces today would be most
peculiar because it leaves intact state and federal laws that permit life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles who commit homicides. The Court thus
acknowledges that there is nothing inherent in the psyche of a person less than
[eighteen] that prevents him from acquiring the moral agency necessary to
warrant a life-without-parole sentence. . . . The Court is quite willing to accept
that a [seventeen]-year-old who pulls the trigger on a firearm can demonstrate
sufficient depravity and irredeemability to be denied reentry into society, but
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issue is whether Graham applies to a lengthy term-of-years-withoutparole sentence that is imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender.
In his Graham dissent, Justice Alito emphasized that the majority’s
holding was limited to “ ‘the sentence of life without parole’ ” and in
no way affected term-of-years sentences.77 While several courts have
followed this reasoning, Part III, Section B demonstrates why the
reasoning is flawed and leads to an unconstitutional result. The second issue Graham leaves unresolved concerns the manner in which
states can achieve compliance with its holding. As the dissent correctly noted, the Court’s holding “invite[s] a host of line-drawing
problems . . . . But what, exactly, does such a ‘meaningful’ opportunity entail? When must it occur? And what Eighth Amendment principles will govern review by parole boards the Court now demands that
States empanel?”78 This matter is addressed and expanded upon in
Parts III and IV.
III. GRAHAM’S APPLICABILITY TO TERM-OF-YEARS-WITHOUT-PAROLE
JUVENILE SENTENCES
Courts across the nation are at a loss regarding Graham’s applicability to lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Section A provides an exhaustive review of the case law and the two approaches courts have taken. Section B offers a critical analysis of each approach and ultimately
rejects both.
A. Current Approaches to Graham’s Applicability to
Term-of-Years Sentences
1. Graham Does Not Apply to Term-of-Years Sentences
(a) Arizona Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals of Arizona rejects Graham’s applicability to
a term-of-years sentence.79 In State v. Kasic, the court considered an
aggregate juvenile sentence of 139.75 years, imposed for thirty-two
felony convictions that stemmed from six arsons and one attempted
insists that a [seventeen]-year-old who rapes an [eight]-year-old and leaves her
for dead does not.
Id. at 2055 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In the meantime, courts continue to
uphold life without parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. See, e.g., Gonzalez v.
State, 50 So. 3d 633, 635-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 869 (Ind.
2012); State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶¶ 97-98, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 797 N.W.2d 451, 478.
Further discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
77. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 2030 (majority
opinion)).
78. Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 414-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).
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arson Kasic committed during a one-year period beginning at the age
of seventeen.80 The court affirmed Kasic’s sentence and held Graham
inapplicable on the ground that the Graham holding was expressly
limited to sentences of “life without parole solely for a nonhomicide
offense”81 and did not require a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s eventual release from prison.82
(b) Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida has also pronounced that Graham does not apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences.83 In Guzman v. State, the defendant was sentenced to sixty
years of imprisonment for violating his probation, which had been
imposed for offenses he committed as a juvenile.84 Guzman argued on
appeal that his sixty-year sentence constituted a de facto life sentence in violation of Graham.85 The court rejected this argument because it “believe[d] that the express holding of Graham established a
bright-line and all-encompassing prohibition on actual life sentences
without the possibility of parole” and “did not address the concept of
a de facto life sentence.”86 The court further stated:
[I]t is logistically impossible to determine what might or might not
constitute a de facto life sentence—assuming such a concept is to
be considered in the first instance. We should not burden our trial
courts by directing them to function as actuaries in determining
each individual defendant’s particularized life expectancy.87

Accordingly, the court affirmed Guzman’s sixty-year sentence.88 It
also certified conflict with the decisions of the First District Court of
Appeal of Florida, and it certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court as being of great public importance: “1. Does
Graham v. Florida . . . apply to lengthy term-of-years sentences that

80. Id. at 411.
81. Id. at 414 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023).
82. Id. at 415 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030). Upon concluding that “Graham
does not categorically bar” lengthy term-of-years sentences, id., the court applied the
proportionality approach and upheld Kasic’s sentence, id. at 415-16.
83. Guzman v. State, No. 4D12-1354, 2013 WL 949889, at *1, *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar.
13, 2013).
84. Id. at *1. At the age of fourteen, Guzman committed several violent offenses to
which he pleaded guilty; his sentence included “juvenile probation to be followed by adult
probation.” Id. After reaching the age of majority, Guzman was convicted of kidnapping
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. The court also imposed a concurrent life sentence for violation of probation, which was subsequently reversed and replaced by a sixtyyear prison term. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id.
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amount to de facto life sentences?” and “2. If so, at what point does a
term-of-years sentence become a de facto life sentence?”89
(c) Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal
The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida likewise rejects Graham’s applicability to a lengthy term-of-years sentence.90 In Henry v.
State, seventeen-year-old Henry broke into a stranger’s apartment,
battered the victim, threatened her with a gun, and sexually assaulted her repeatedly.91 He then made her take a shower and forced her
to drive him to an ATM and withdraw money.92 Henry was sentenced
to concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling ninety years imprisonment.93 On appeal, Henry argued that because his life expectancy
was 64.3 years,94 the ninety-year sentence constituted a de facto life
without parole sentence, in violation of Graham.95 The court rejected
Henry’s argument and quoted Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion that
the Graham holding does not affect a lengthy term-of-years sentence.96 The court also distinguished the “lengthy aggregate term-ofyears sentence without the possibility of parole” from a “life sentence
without parole.”97 Moreover, it noted that not a single Florida court
had invalidated a lengthy term-of-years sentence pursuant to Graham, and other jurisdictions were split on the issue.98 Lastly, the
court reasoned that a holding that refuses to extend Graham to a
89. Id.
90. Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The Florida Supreme
Court has accepted jurisdiction of the case. Henry v. State, 107 So. 3d 405 (Fla. 2012). See
also Johnson v. State, 108 So. 3d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (mem.) (per curiam) (affirming the juvenile offender’s 100-year sentence for armed burglary of a dwelling, and
certifying conflict with Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and Adams v.
State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *1 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012)); Mediate v.
State, 108 So. 3d 703, 704, 706 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“reject[ing] the defendant’s invitation
to revisit Henry,” and affirming his 130-year sentence for kidnapping and four counts of
sexual battery).
91. Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1085.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1086. Henry was convicted of “three counts of sexual battery with a deadly
weapon or physical force, one count of kidnapping with intent to commit a felony (with a
firearm), two counts of robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of burglary of a dwelling,
and one count of possession of twenty grams or less of cannabis.” Id. at 1085. His original
sentence included several life sentences, which was modified pursuant to Graham. Id. at
1085-86.
94. Id. at 1086. Henry filed a National Vital Statistics Report that demonstrated his
life expectancy at birth was 64.3 years based on his sex and race. Id.
95. Id. Under Florida law, an inmate must serve eighty-five percent of his sentence
before becoming eligible for release pursuant to gaintime; thus, Henry had to serve at least
76.5 years in prison. Id.
96. See id. at 1087.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1087-89. The court explained that intermediate appellate courts in
California were split on the issue, whereas courts in Georgia and Arizona had consistently
rejected Graham’s applicability to term-of-years sentences. Id. at 1088-89.
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term-of-years sentence will be easy to follow.99 On the other hand,
Graham provides no direction for a holding to the contrary:
At what number of years would the Eighth Amendment become
implicated in the sentencing of a juvenile: twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, some lesser or greater number? Would gain time be taken into
account? Could the number vary from offender to offender based
on race, gender, socioeconomic class or other criteria? Does the
number of crimes matter? There is language in the Graham majority opinion that suggests that no matter the number of offenses or
victims or type of crime, a juvenile may not receive a sentence that
will cause him to spend his entire life incarcerated without a
chance for rehabilitation, in which case it would make no logical
difference whether the sentence is “life” or 107 years. Without any
tools to work with, however, we can only apply Graham as it is
written. If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say
what that is.100

(d) Florida Second District Court of Appeal
Similarly, the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida held
Graham inapplicable to a term-of-years sentence in Walle v. State.101
In Pinellas County, Walle was sentenced to a total of twenty-seven
years imprisonment for armed sexual battery, two counts of kidnapping, and three counts of armed robbery.102 Subsequently, in Hillsborough County he was sentenced to a total of sixty-five years imprisonment upon convictions on eighteen counts, including armed
kidnappings and armed sexual batteries.103 The sixty-five-year sentence was ordered to run consecutively with the twenty-seven-year
sentence.104 Walle committed the offenses underlying the sentences
two weeks apart; he was thirteen years old at the time.105 On appeal,
Walle argued that his aggregate sentence of ninety-two years was the
functional equivalent of life without parole, in violation of Graham.106
The court interpreted Graham as requiring the presence of the
following factors in order for Graham’s categorical ban to apply: “(1)
the offender was a juvenile when he committed his offense,(2) the
sentence imposed applied to a singular nonhomicide offense, (3) the
99. Id. at 1089.
100. Id. (footnote omitted).
101. Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (certifying conflict with
Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012)).
102. Id. at 968.
103. Id. In Hillsborough County, Walle pleaded guilty to “two counts of armed
kidnapping, eleven counts of armed sexual battery with a deadly weapon, one count of
armed burglary of a structure, one count of grand theft motor vehicle, one count of
attempted armed robbery with a firearm, one count of grand theft in the third degree, and
one count of carjacking with a deadly weapon.” Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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offender was ‘sentenced to life,’ and (4) the sentence does not provide
the offender with any possibility of release during his lifetime.”107
The court found that only the first factor characterized Walle’s sentences; thus, Graham was inapplicable.108 The court acknowledged
the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal’s concerns about extending
Graham to term-of-years sentences109 and added: “[T]he case before
this court raises additional questions: What if the aggregate sentences are from different cases? From different circuits? From different
jurisdictions? If from different jurisdictions, which jurisdiction must
modify its sentence or sentences to avoid constitutional infirmity?”110
The court “cannot expand the Supreme Court’s ruling beyond the
limitations it set forth in its opinion, specifically its holding that
Graham applies solely to a single sentence of life without parole.”111
(e) Georgia Supreme Court
Georgia state courts have held Graham inapplicable to a term-ofyears sentence.112 In Adams v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia
affirmed the following sentence of a fourteen- or fifteen-year-old juvenile offender: life for aggravated child molestation, with twentyfive years to be served in prison and the remainder on probation, plus
twenty years for child molestation, with five years to be served in
prison and the remainder on probation.113 The court reasoned that by
its terms Graham forbids only a “life without parole” sentence for a
juvenile nonhomicide offender and “does not foreclose the possibility”
that a juvenile will spend the rest of his life in prison.114 “Clearly,
‘[n]othing in the Court’s opinion affects the imposition of a sentence
to a term of years without the possibility of parole.’ ”115 Thus, no categorical ban applies to a term-of-years sentence.116

107. Id. at 970 (reasoning that the Graham holding “concern[ed] only those juvenile
offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense” (quoting
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010))).
108. Id. at 971.
109. Id. at 972 (citing Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 971.
112. See Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011); Middleton v. State, 721
S.E.2d 111, 113 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011).
113. Adams, 707 S.E.2d at 361-62. The indictment alleged the offenses occurred
between May 1, 2007 and March 10, 2008; August 4, 2005 marked Adams’ thirteenth
birthday. Id. at 361-62.
114. Id. at 364-65 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
115. Id. at 365 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
116. Id. Aside from a strictly literal reading of Graham’s holding and reference to
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia did not provide any
analysis in support of its holding regarding the applicability of the categorical approach.
See id. The court proceeded to apply the proportionality approach and held that Adams’s
sentence did “not raise a threshold inference of gross disproportionality.” Id.
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(f) Louisiana Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that Graham does not
apply to a term-of-years sentence without parole.117 In State v.
Brown, the defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and
four counts of armed robbery for offenses he committed at the age of
sixteen.118 Brown was sentenced to imprisonment without parole for
aggravated kidnapping and ten-year imprisonment without parole
for each armed robbery; the five sentences were to run consecutively.119 Upon Brown’s post-Graham appeal, the district court amended
each of his five sentences by removing parole ineligibility.120 The
court of appeals affirmed, and the State appealed the amendment of
the ten-year sentences.121
The issue before the Louisiana Supreme Court was whether a seventy-year sentence, imposed on a juvenile nonhomicide offender, is
constitutional pursuant to Graham.122 The court began by discussing
Graham and the accompanying dissenting opinions.123 It then drew a
distinction between Graham’s life sentence for a single offense and
Brown’s consecutive fixed-term sentences for multiple offenses.124 The
court also pointed out the “difficulty of applying Graham to non-life
sentences.”125 Moreover, recent state legislation achieved compliance
with Graham by providing that a juvenile nonhomicide offender sentenced to life imprisonment may be eligible for parole after serving
thirty years.126 On the other hand, state laws explicitly prohibit parole for armed robbery, as well as for a person convicted of three or
more felonies, and do not make an exception for juvenile offenders.127
Lastly, the court concluded that “nothing in Graham addresses a

117. State v. Brown, 2012-0872 (La. 5/7/13); 2013 WL 1878911, at *1. The issue before
the court was whether Graham “applies in a case in which the juvenile offender committed
multiple offenses resulting in cumulative sentences matching or exceeding his life expectancy without the opportunity of securing early release from confinement.” Id.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *4
121. Id. at *4-5.
122. Id. at *5. The court explained that Brown “will be eligible for parole on the life
sentence after serving [thirty] years . . . at approximately age [forty-six] . . . .” Id. However,
if his original four ten-year sentences without parole were reinstated, he could not become
eligible for release until the age of eighty-six. Id.
123. Id. at *6-7.
124. Id. at *8-9 (quoting Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012)).
125. Id. at *10 (quoting Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1088-89 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).
126. Id. at *12-13. The court explained that in State v. Shaffer it held the thenapplicable statutes unconstitutional as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders because
they precluded parole eligibility. Id. at *11. However, the Shaffer “decision was only ‘an
interim measure (based on the legislature’s own criteria) pending the legislature’s response
to Graham.’ ” Id. at *12 (quoting State v. Shaffer, 11-1756 (La. 11/23/11), 77 So. 3d 939,
943 n.6).
127. Id. at *14.
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defendant convicted of multiple offenses and given term of year
sentences . . . .”128
As our state legislature has provided for these sentences, as it has
the constitutional authority to do, we have no authority, absent a
disproportionality review not possible or requested here, to amend
these sentences. In our view, Graham does not prohibit consecutive term of year sentences for multiple offenses committed while
a defendant was under the age of [eighteen], even if they might
exceed a defendant’s lifetime, and, absent any further guidance from the United States Supreme Court, we defer to the
legislature . . . .129

Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s amendment of
Brown’s life sentence, but reversed the amendment of the four tenyear sentences for armed robberies upon holding that the court was
not authorized to remove parole ineligibility.130
(g) Texas First District Court of Appeals
In Burnell v. State, the First District Court of Appeals of Texas
rejected the juvenile offender’s argument that his twenty-five-year
sentence for aggravated robbery violated Graham’s categorical ban.131
The court explained that Burnell’s “reading of Graham is overbroad”132 for the Graham Court applied the categorical approach because the case involved “ ‘a particular type of sentence as it applie[d]
to an entire class of offenders who [had] committed a range of
crimes.’ ”133 In contrast, Burnell contested not “a particular type of
sentence” but long sentences in general.134 Moreover, the Graham
holding was limited to a life without parole sentence.135 Thus, the
court held Graham’s categorical ban inapplicable.136

128. Id. at *15.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *15-16.
131. Burnell v. State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *1, *8-9 (Tex. App. Jan.
5, 2012).
132. Id. at *8.
133. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022-23 (2010)).
134. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id. at *9. Accordingly, the court applied the proportionality approach outlined in
Harmelin v. Michigan and held that Burnell’s sentence was not “grossly disproportionate
to the violent nature of this crime.” Id. See also Diamond v. State, Nos. 09-11-00478-CR &
09-11-00479-CR, 2012 WL 1431232, at *1, *4, *5 (Tex. App. Apr. 25, 2012) (affirming, without any mention of Graham, a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s ninety-nine-year sentence
on the ground that the defendant failed to prove that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offense).
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(h) United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Lastly, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, Graham only applies to technical “life” without parole
sentences and does not apply to a lengthy term-of-years sentence
even when it constitutes the functional equivalent of life without parole.137 In Bunch v. Smith, sixteen-year-old Bunch and his accomplice
robbed and kidnapped a college student and took turns repeatedly
raping her orally, anally, and vaginally at gunpoint.138 Bunch was
sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling eighty-nine
years.139 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Bunch’s sentence and held Graham and Miller inapplicable to “consecutive, fixedterm sentences for committing multiple nonhomicide offenses.”140 The
court reasoned that Graham’s holding, by its plain language, is limited to “ ‘life without parole sentence[s],’ ”141 and if the Supreme Court
wishes to expand that holding, it must do so explicitly.142 The Graham Court “did not analyze sentencing laws or actual sentencing
practices regarding consecutive, fixed-term sentences for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders,” which “demonstrates that the Court did not
even consider the constitutionality of such sentences, let alone clearly
establish that they can violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments.”143 Moreover, not a single federal
court has extended Graham to consecutive, fixed-term sentences, and
state courts are split on the issue.144 Lastly, the court noted that a
contrary holding would leave many questions unanswered, such as
the number of years that would implicate Graham’s holding, whether
gaintime would be considered, and whether the number of crimes
would be relevant.145

137. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v. Bobby,
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
138. Id. at 547-48; see also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
139. Bunch, 685 F.3d at 548.
140. See id. at 553.
141. Id. at 552 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010)).
142. See id. at 553 (quoting Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012)).
143. Id. at 552.
144. Id. at 551-52.
145. Id. at 552 (citing Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089). See also Goins v. Smith, No. 4:09-CV1551, 2012 WL 3023306, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2012) (upholding a juvenile nonhomicide
offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty-four years imprisonment because, pursuant to
Bunch, Graham applies only to sentences that are technically life without parole sentences,
and not to sentences that are their functional equivalent); Angel v. Commonwealth, 704
S.E.2d 386, 401-02 (Va. 2011) (affirming a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s “three life sentences [without parole], plus sentences of twenty years and twelve months, all of which
were to run consecutively” on the ground that the defendant might be eligible for conditional release at the age of sixty, and holding that the provision for conditional release
complied with Graham’s “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” mandate).

1046

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1027

2. Graham Applies to Term-of-Years Sentences That Are the
Functional Equivalent of Life Without Parole
(a) California Supreme Court
Pursuant to Graham, the California Supreme Court held that a
term-of-years sentence that does not allow for parole eligibility within a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s natural life expectancy constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.146 In People v. Caballero, the
court held that a sixteen-year-old offender’s aggregate sentence of
110 years to life, imposed pursuant to three attempted-murder convictions and three corresponding firearm enhancements, violated the
Eighth Amendment.147 According to the court, Miller v. Alabama
“made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’ on life without parole sentences applies to all nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders, including the term-of-years sentence that amounts to the functional
equivalent of a life without parole sentence . . . .”148 Moreover, Graham does not “focus on the precise sentence meted out”;149 instead, it
requires states to “provide a juvenile offender ‘with some realistic
opportunity to obtain release’ from prison during his or her expected
lifetime.”150 Because Caballero was required to serve over a hundred
years before becoming parole-eligible, the sentence unconstitutionally
denied him the requisite opportunity to obtain release based on
“ ‘demonstrate[d] growth and maturity.’ ”151
(b) Colorado Court of Appeals
The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that a lengthy aggregate
term-of-years sentence that is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham.152 In People v. Rainer, the court considered the 112year sentence of a seventeen-year-old offender who was convicted of
146. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012).
147. Id. at 293. On the first attempted-murder count, the defendant was sentenced to
fifteen years to life and to a consecutive term of twenty-five years to life for the
corresponding firearm enhancement. Id. On the second attempted murder count, he was
sentenced to an additional consecutive term of fifteen years to life, plus twenty years for
the corresponding firearm enhancement. Id. On the third attempted-murder count he was
sentenced to a consecutive term of fifteen years to life, plus twenty years for the
corresponding firearm enhancement. Id.
148. Id. at 295; see also id. at 294 (explaining that by extending Graham’s reasoning to
homicide offenders, the Court in Miller v. Alabama “made it clear that Graham’s ‘flat ban’
on life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders in nonhomicide cases applies to their
sentencing equation regardless of . . . how a sentencing court structures the life without
parole sentence” (citing Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, 2469 (2012))).
149. Id. at 295.
150. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010)).
151. Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029).
152. People v. Rainer, No. 10CA2414, 2013 WL 1490107, at *1, *12 (Colo. App. Apr. 11,
2013).
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“two counts of attempted first degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, one count of first degree burglary, one count of aggravated robbery, and sentence enhancement counts for crimes of violence.”153 The court concluded that Rainer’s aggregate sentence “qualifie[d] as an unconstitutional de facto sentence to life without parole”154 because it did not “offer him . . . a meaningful opportunity to
obtain release before the end of his expected life span . . . .”155 Rainer
would become eligible for parole at the age of seventy-five, beyond his
life expectancy of 63.8 to 72 years, as projected by the Centers for
Disease Control.156 Rainer further argued that even if he were still
alive at the time of his parole eligibility, his release would be unlikely
because the Colorado State Board of Parole denies parole to nearly
ninety percent of offenders upon initial eligibility.157 The court next
considered the Graham opinion and the subsequent case law that
demonstrate that “the Supreme Court has continued on its decisional
trend of providing more constitutional protections for juvenile offenders.”158 The issue being of first impression, the court summarized the
rulings of other jurisdictions and found persuasive “the reasoning of
those cases that have extended Graham to de facto sentences to life
without parole.”159 The court also relied on the “broad nature of Graham’s directives,” noting “the Court did not employ a rigid or formalistic set of rules designed to narrow the application of its holding”;
rather, the Court “employed expansive language.”160 Lastly, the court
“[found] it instructive that . . . the Colorado General Assembly, both
before and after Graham, has adopted legislation aligned with the
principles articulated in Roper, Graham, and Miller.”161 Accordingly,
the court vacated Rainer’s 112-year sentence on the ground that it
was the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole that
“improperly denie[d] [him] a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Graham.162
However, the same day that it announced Rainer, the court in
People v. Lucero affirmed a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s eightyfour-year sentence upon concluding that it did not constitute a life
153. Id. at *1. Rainer, at the age of seventeen, shot two people multiple times while he
burglarized an apartment and stole a stereo. Id. Rainer’s original sentence was 224 years—
the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for each count and ordered them to be
served consecutively. Id. The appellate court vacated the consecutive sentences for some of
the convictions; on remand, Rainer was sentenced to an aggregate term of 112 years. Id.
154. Id. at *12.
155. Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court first concluded that Graham applies retroactively. Id. at *2.
156. Id. at *6, *12.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *9.
159. Id. at *9-12, *13.
160. Id. at *13-14.
161. Id. at *14.
162. Id. at *15 (internal quotation omitted).
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sentence without parole.163 Lucero was convicted of “conspiracy to
commit first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and two
counts of second degree assault” based on offenses he committed at
the age of fifteen.164 His consecutive prison terms totaled eighty-four
years.165 The court acknowledged Rainer, but concluded that Lucero’s
sentence did not constitute a life sentence without parole because
Lucero would be eligible for parole at the age of fifty-seven, “well
within” his life expectancy of seventy-five years.166 Thus, the court
affirmed Lucero’s sentence on the ground that it “provides for a
meaningful opportunity for release within his natural life span.”167
(c) Florida First District Court of Appeal
According to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, Graham
is applicable to a term-of-years sentence that constitutes de facto life
without parole.168 In turn, the court defines a de facto life sentence—
also known as a term-of-years sentence that is the functional
equivalent of a life sentence—as one that exceeds the defendant’s
life expectancy.169
In Thomas v. State, the First District Court of Appeal considered a
seventeen-year-old offender’s concurrent fifty-year sentences for
armed robbery and aggravated battery.170 The court concluded that
given Thomas’s life expectancy of 70.2 years and his release in his
late sixties, his sentence was not the functional equivalent of life
without parole.171 However, the court conceded that “at some point, a
term-of-years sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life
sentence . . . .”172 The court “encourage[d] the Legislature to consider
modifying Florida’s current sentencing scheme to include a mechanism for review of juvenile offenders sentenced as adults as discussed
in Graham.”173
The court decided Gridine v. State on the same day as Thomas v.
State.174 In Gridine, the fourteen-year-old offender was sentenced to
seventy years imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder and to
163. People v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1 (Colo. App. Apr. 11,
2013).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *3. The court declined to consider Defendant’s argument that “serving 20
years in prison takes 16 years off life expectancy” because he failed to raise it in the trial
court. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *4, *5.
168. See Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (per curiam).
169. See id. at 645-46.
170. Id. at 645.
171. Id. at 646.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 647.
174. Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
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a concurrent twenty-five-year term for attempted armed robbery.175
The court affirmed Gridine’s seventy-year sentence on the ground
that the Graham holding was limited to a juvenile sentence of “ ‘life
without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.’ ”176 The court
analogized to Thomas and recognized that “at some point, a term-ofyears sentence may become the functional equivalent of a life
sentence,” but concluded that Gridine’s seventy-year sentence did not
constitute a de facto life sentence.177 The court certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court as being of great public
importance: “Does the United States Supreme Court decision in
Graham v. Florida prohibit sentencing a fourteen-year-old to a prison
sentence of seventy years for the crime of attempted first-degree
murder?”178 The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction.179
Subsequently, in Floyd v. State, the court held unconstitutional a
seventeen-year-old offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty years imprisonment imposed for two counts of armed robbery.180 The court
concluded that because Floyd’s sentence exceeded his life expectancy,
even when accounting for the possibility of early release pursuant to
gaintime, it was “the functional equivalent of a life without parole
sentence and will not provide him with a meaningful or realistic opportunity to obtain release.”181 Accordingly, the court remanded the
case for resentencing, and urged the legislature to follow Graham’s
guidance and “ ‘explore the means and mechanisms for compliance.’ ”182
Thereafter, in Smith v. State the court considered a seventeenyear-old offender’s aggregate sentence of eighty years imprisonment,
imposed in two separate cases involving a total of eight offenses.183
The court concluded that Smith’s eighty-year sentence was not the
functional equivalent of life without parole because pursuant to the
applicable gaintime statutes he could become eligible for release sig175. Id. at 910.
176. Id. at 911 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010)).
177. Id. Unlike in Thomas, in Gridine the court did not discuss the defendant’s life
expectancy. See id.
178. Gridine v. State, 93 So. 3d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (internal citation
omitted).
179. Gridine v. State, No. SC12-1223, 2012 WL 4839014 (Fla. Oct. 11, 2012).
180. Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (per curiam) (noting that the
defendant was initially sentenced to life imprisonment, but pursuant to Graham he was
resentenced to two consecutive forty-year terms of imprisonment).
181. Id. at 46-47. Because Florida has abolished its parole system, a prisoner’s
sentence may be shortened only through incentive and meritorious gaintime, and a
defendant must serve at least eighty-five percent of the prison sentence. Id. at 46. Even if
Floyd received the maximum gaintime, he would not be released until the age of eightyfive. Id.
182. Id. at 47 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
183. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that the defendant
was convicted of two counts of sexual battery; two counts of burglary; and one count each of
aggravated assault, kidnapping, possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony,
and possession of burglary tools, all committed within a two-day period).
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nificantly before he turns eighty-one years old.184 Thus, Smith’s
eighty-year sentence was constitutional because, through the availability of gaintime, he was provided with a “ ‘meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,’ ” as required by Graham.185
Most recently, in Adams v. State, the court reluctantly held Graham applicable to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that constituted
de facto life without parole.186 Adams was sixteen years old when he
committed the offenses underlying his attempted first-degree murder, armed burglary, and armed robbery convictions.187 He was sentenced to sixty years imprisonment.188 The court summarized its
precedent as follows: “Graham applies not only to life without parole
sentences, but also to lengthy term-of-years sentences that amount to
de facto life sentences,” and “a de facto life sentence is one that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy.”189 Adams’s sixty-year sentence
constituted a de facto life sentence because he would not become eligible for release during his life expectancy.190 Therefore, Adams’s sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Graham.191 The court certified conflict with Henry v. State and certified the following questions
to the Florida Supreme Court as being “of great public importance”:
(1) “Does Graham v. Florida apply [to lengthy] term-of-years sentences that amount to de facto life sentences?” and (2) “if so, at what
point does a term-of-years sentence become a de facto life sentence?”192
(d) United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
Graham applicable to a lengthy term-of-years-without-parole juve184. Id. at 374. Pursuant to the gaintime statutes of 1985, the year Smith’s sentences
were imposed, Smith could become eligible for release after serving significantly fewer
than sixty-three years. Id. Interestingly, the court did not discuss the defendant’s actual
life expectancy. See id. at 374-75.
185. Id. at 375 (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030).
186. Adams v. State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *1, *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8,
2012). The court noted that if it were not for its precedent, it would have affirmed the defendant’s sentence pursuant to the Fifth District Court’s reasoning in Henry v. State, 82 So.
3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). Id. at *1. The court also quoted Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d
10, 12 (Fla. 1978), where the Florida Supreme Court rejected the notion “that the defendant’s life expectancy should be taken into account . . . because ‘[a]ny sentence, no matter
how short, may eventually extend beyond the life of a prisoner.’ ” Id. at *2.
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id.
189. Id. at *2.
190. Id. (explaining that Adams was required to serve at least 58.5 years in prison
before becoming eligible for release; by then, he would be almost seventy-six years old,
which is beyond his life expectancy as shown by the National Vital Statistics Reports).
191. Id.
192. Id. at *2-3 (internal citation omitted).
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nile sentence.193 In United States v. Mathurin, the court held unconstitutional a juvenile’s aggregate sentence of 307 years without parole imposed for numerous nonhomicide offenses.194 Specifically, the
defendant, whose age is unclear, was sentenced to consecutive terms
of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit robbery, conspiracy to carry a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, attempted robbery,
thirteen counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
violence, thirteen counts of robbery, and two counts of carjacking.195
The court reasoned that the sentence did not provide the juvenile
with the requisite opportunity to obtain release upon demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.196
(e) United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
held that Graham applies to a lengthy term-of-years sentence that
fails to provide a juvenile offender a meaningful opportunity for release during his lifetime.197 In Thomas v. Pennsylvania, the defendant was convicted of “rape, indecent assault, and multiple counts of
armed robbery and burglary” for offenses he committed at the ages of
fourteen and fifteen.198 Thomas’s sentence was 65 to 150 years of imprisonment, with parole eligibility at the age of eighty-three.199
Thomas filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and argued that his
sentence violated Graham. The State agreed, and the magistrate
judge remanded the case for resentencing.200 The district court agreed
and concluded that Thomas’s parole eligibility “more than a decade
beyond his life expectancy” contravenes Graham’s “meaningful opportunity” mandate.201 The court reasoned as follows:
This Court does not believe that the Supreme Court’s analysis
would change simply because a sentence is labeled a term-of-years
sentence rather than a life sentence if that term-of[-]years sentence does not provide a meaningful opportunity for parole in a ju193. United States v. Mathurin, No. 09-21075-Cr-COOKE, 2011 WL 2580775, at *3
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2011).
194. Id. at *1-3, *6 (noting that under the applicable federal statute, the sentences
were required to run consecutively; in addition, Congress had abolished parole for offenses
committed after November 1987).
195. Id. at *1.
196. Id. at *3. The court held that the consecutive sentencing statutory provision was
unconstitutional as applied to Mathurin and resentenced him to 492 months; he may become eligible for release around the age of 53. Id. at *3, *6.
197. Thomas v. Pennsylvania, No. 10-4537, 2012 WL 6678686, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21,
2012).
198. Id. at *1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *2.
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venile’s lifetime. The Court’s concerns about juvenile culpability
and inadequate penological justification apply equally in both situations, and there is no basis to distinguish sentences based on
their label. To find otherwise would degrade the holding of the Supreme Court. Therefore, this Court finds that the sentence imposed in this case, though a term-of-years sentence, violates Graham as it provides no meaningful opportunity to obtain release,
based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, during
Thomas’s expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
sentence imposed amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.202

B. Problems With the Current Approaches to Graham’s Applicability
to Term-of-Years Sentences
1. Holding Graham Inapplicable Nullifies a Constitutional Rule
The Court of Appeals of Arizona; the Fourth, Fifth, and Second
District Courts of Appeal of Florida; the Supreme Court of Georgia;
the Supreme Court of Louisiana; the First District Court of Appeals
of Texas; and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have erroneously concluded that Graham is inapplicable to the
lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders.203 The main rationale of these courts is flawed, and
their holding violates Graham and enables courts to circumvent the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
The aforementioned courts have one rationale in common: the Supreme Court explicitly limited Graham’s holding to “life without parole” sentences.204 By strictly adhering to the language of the Graham
holding, the courts reach a conclusion that does not follow logically
from the premise. Graham was technically sentenced to “life imprisonment,” not “life without parole.”205 Yet, the Graham Court framed
the issue and holding in terms of “life without parole” because it recognized it as Graham’s practical sentence,206 given that Florida had
abolished parole.207 Similarly, a court that imposes a lengthy term-ofyears sentence does not technically render a “life” sentence; nevertheless, the lengthy term is a practical life sentence when in reality it
202. Id.
203. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v. Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); State v. Kasic, 265 P.3d 410, 415 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); Walle v.
State, 99 So. 3d 967, 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Henry v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1087,
1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 365 (Ga. 2011); Burnell v.
State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *8-9 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2012). See also
supra Part III.A.1.
204. See cases cited supra note 203.
205. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2020 (2010).
206. See id. at 2017-18, 2030.
207. Id. at 2020.
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ensures that the defendant will be incarcerated until his death. As
one appellate court noted, “[f]inding a determinate sentence exceeding a juvenile's life expectancy constitutional because it is not labeled
an [sic] LWOP [life without parole] sentence is Orwellian. Simply
put, a distinction based on changing a label . . . is arbitrary and baseless.”208 Courts ought not to violate a constitutional rule by engaging
in a simple play on words.
More significantly, rejection of Graham’s applicability to lengthy
term-of-years-without-parole sentences violates Graham because it is
wholly irreconcilable with the spirit and reasoning of the opinion.
The Graham Court made clear that juveniles are constitutionally different from adults because the characteristics of youth render them
less morally culpable;209 additionally, juveniles’ incorrigibility cannot
be determined reliably at the outset, and they are more amenable to
reform.210 Moreover, a life without parole sentence is the second
harshest punishment;211 its imposition on a juvenile nonhomicide offender cannot be justified by any penological theory212 and “improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity.”213 A lengthy term-of-years-without-parole sentence has
precisely the same features that Graham prohibits: it imposes the
second-harshest punishment on an offender whose culpability is diminished by his or her youth, it does so in the absence of sufficient
penological justification, and it deprives the juvenile offender of a
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated reform. Thus, the rejection of Graham’s applicability to lengthy termof-years sentences is the antithesis of the Graham Court’s mandate
and reasoning; relatedly, it enables courts to circumvent and nullify
the Graham holding. As one author explained,
[w]hat difference is there really between 120 years and life besides
semantics, because the reality is the same either way. All sentencing courts would have to do is stop issuing LWOP and instead
start sentencing those same juveniles to 100 years, and the problem is solved. Gone would be the idea that juveniles are different,
less culpable, and more deserving of a meaningful opportunity for

208. People v. De Jesús Nuñez, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review
dismissed by People v. Nunez, 287 P.3d 71 (Cal. 2012) (citing People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d
291 (Cal. 2012)).
209. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-28, 2030; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455,
2464 (2012) (noting that “Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of sentencing”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70,
578 (2005).
210. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
211. Id. at 2027.
212. Id. at 2028-30.
213. Id. at 2029.
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release. Gone would be the incentive to rehabilitate. Gone would
be Graham.214

Lastly, some courts reason, and others certainly contemplate, that
extending Graham to term-of-years sentences would generate a multitude of line-drawing problems.215 Undeniably, holding Graham applicable to lengthy term-of-years sentences would trigger significant
questions. For example, at what point does a term-of-years sentence
become unconstitutional? Must courts account for gaintime? In the
event of multiple convictions, does Graham apply to the individual or
aggregate sentence? If Graham applies to the aggregate sentence and
multiple cases are involved, which jurisdiction’s sentencing authority
is restricted, and which victim’s rights are not fully vindicated? While
these are legitimate concerns, they do not justify the abrogation of
the Supreme Court’s decree when a logical solution is available. That
solution is to provide all juvenile nonhomicide offenders with the opportunity for parole or sentencing review hearings. As discussed in
Part IV, Graham, even when its holding is read narrowly and in a
technical sense, requires states to make parole or sentencing review
hearings available in order to provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders
who are sentenced to life imprisonment with the requisite opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated reform. In turn, the
availability of such a mechanism should be extended to all juvenile
nonhomicide offenders, thereby eliminating the line-drawing concerns of courts that insist on circumventing Graham by refusing to
apply it to term-of-years sentences.
2. Holding Graham Applicable is Proper, but Reliance on Life
Expectancy Precludes Full Compliance
While the Supreme Court of California, the Colorado Court of Appeals, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, and the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have
properly held that Graham applies to the lengthy term-of-yearswithout-parole sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders, their approach falls short of complying with Graham’s mandate. Courts that
apply Graham to term-of-years sentences look to the defendant’s life
expectancy and projected release eligibility. If there is no possibility
for release during the offender’s life expectancy, as determined by the
National Vital Statistics Report, the term-of-years sentence is uncon-

214. Leanne Palmer, Note, Juvenile Sentencing in the Wake of Graham v. Florida: A
Look Into Uncharted Territory, 17 BARRY L. REV. 133, 147 (2011).
215. See, e.g., Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Bunch v.
Bobby, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013); Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Henry
v. State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
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stitutional, for it is the functional equivalent of life without parole.216
At first glance, one cannot argue with the logic of relying on life expectancy statistics as a method of determining the point at which a
term-of-years sentence becomes the functional equivalent of life
without parole. However, there are significant problems with this
approach in the context of sentencing and in light of Graham.
The greatest, and fatal, deficiency of the life expectancy approach
is that it fails to comply with Graham’s mandate. In Graham, the
Court’s disdain for the life without parole sentence stemmed from its
findings that the sentence denies any hope of release, “forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal,”217 and “improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”218 Accordingly, the Court held that states are constitutionally required to
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with some “realistic,”219
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated
maturity and rehabilitation.”220 The life expectancy approach deprives juvenile offenders of this requisite meaningful opportunity because it affords no possibility of release until a specified time, regardless of reform. To demonstrate the disconnect between the life expectancy approach and Graham’s mandate, consider the following: A
term-of-years sentence that provides an opportunity for release just
before the juvenile offender’s expected death, either pursuant to gaintime or upon the expiration of the sentence, satisfies the life expectancy approach because technically the offender is not required to
spend his “entire” life in prison. Yet it fails Graham’s mandate because it deprives the offender of a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate he has been reformed and thus should be released early.
Providing for the possibility of release in time for the offender to die
as a free man or woman is hardly a “meaningful opportunity” as contemplated by the Graham Court.221 As one appellate judge explained:
[The life expectancy] approach misses the mark entirely. . . . [T]he
question is not whether the defendant will have a significant part
of his life remaining at the end of the sentence; rather, it is whether the defendant will have a reasonable opportunity to show that
216. See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People
v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); People v.
Rainer, No. 10CA2414, 2013 WL 1490107, at *1, *12 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); Adams v.
State, No. 1D11-3225, 2012 WL 3193932, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 8, 2012).
217. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
218. Id. at 2029.
219. Id. at 2034.
220. Id. at 2030 (emphasis added).
221. To the contrary, it is arguably cruel to eject into society a person who spent most
of his life imprisoned, thereby causing him to spend his remaining days struggling to
survive for he probably lacks sufficient social and vocational skills, savings, access to
affordable health care, a job, a home, a family, friends, or any other resources or support
systems.
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he has been rehabilitated during the course of the sentence
and is therefore deserving of release at some point before the
sentence expires.
....
In contrast, the term of years sentences we have approved in
this case do not afford the defendant that opportunity. He will be
released at a fixed point in the future, and the timing of his release
will have no connection with his behavior in prison or any efforts
he might make to rehabilitate himself. He might be able to establish his rehabilitation next week, next month, or next year, but it
will make no difference.222

Thus, the life expectancy approach is a wholly inadequate yardstick
for achieving compliance with Graham. Instead, the proper measure
must be whether the offender has a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation and thereby obtain early release.
In addition to violating Graham’s mandate, the life expectancy
approach poses problems of its own. For one, life expectancy calculations are based on the defendant’s race, sex, and year of birth or current age.223 These are all factors that sentencing courts are generally
prohibited from taking into consideration.224 Moreover, if a court is
truly attempting to determine a defendant’s life expectancy, why not
also consider factors such as the offender’s health, personal medical
history, family medical history, national origin, and the toll imprisonment will have on life expectancy? Indubitably, accounting for such
factors would be impractical, if not impossible, for it would create a
new line of problems and transform the life determination into a trial
of its own. The Florida Supreme Court has itself stated:
We reject the notion that an individual’s life expectancy should
be used, or was intended by the Legislature to be used, to mark the
222. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 375-77 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J.,
concurring).
223. See, e.g., People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010); People
v. Lucero, No. 11CA2030, 2013 WL 1459477, at *1, *3 (Colo. App. Apr. 11, 2013); Henry v.
State, 82 So. 3d 1084, 1086, 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu,
Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 10, 2012, at 1, 26-28,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf.
224. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2006) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.”); FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(a) (2012) (“Sentencing is
neutral with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status.”); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-101(3)(c) (2005) (“Sentencing practices must be neutral with respect to the
offender’s race, gender, religion, national origin, or social or economic status.”); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.11(C) (West 2011) (“A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender
for a felony shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background, gender, or
religion of the offender.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-102(4) (West 2012) (“Sentencing
should exclude all considerations respecting race, gender, creed, religion, national origin
and social status of the individual[.]”); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b)(1) (2012) (“Sentencing
should be neutral with respect to race, gender, and social and economic status.”).
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longest term which a particular defendant should serve. Any sentence, no matter how short, may eventually extend beyond the life
of a prisoner. Mortality and life expectancy are irrelevant to limitations on the terms of incarceration set by the Legislature for
criminal misconduct.225

Lastly, the life expectancy approach enables courts to render Graham meaningless by imposing term-of-years sentences that provide
for the possibility of release just before offenders’ expected deaths.
For instance, a sentence that provides for the possibility of release at
the age of sixty-nine would technically not be the functional equivalent of life without parole for a juvenile offender whose life expectancy is seventy years. This empty distinction is analogous to a 150-year
sentence imposed by a court that rejects Graham’s applicability to
term-of-years sentences—both tactics allow courts to comply with
the law in a highly technical sense, while in practice engage in
grave violations.
In sum, holding Graham applicable to lengthy term-of-years sentences pursuant to the life expectancy approach is a better alternative to holding Graham inapplicable and thereby disregarding the
Graham Court’s pronouncement in its entirety. Nevertheless, the life
expectancy approach is inadequate because it fails to comply with
Graham’s mandate of providing a meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated reform, and it unnecessarily implicates line-drawing problems.
IV. PROPER APPROACH: GRAHAM MANDATES PAROLE OR SENTENCING
HEARINGS, APPLIES TO ALL TERM-OF-YEARS SENTENCES, AND
REQUIRES REHABILITATIVE SERVICES
Section A demonstrates that Graham requires states to make parole or sentencing review hearings available to juvenile nonhomicide
offenders who are sentenced to life imprisonment. Section B reiterates why Graham applies to lengthy term-of-years sentences, restates the reasons for rejecting the life expectancy approach, and
proposes that the availability of parole or sentencing review hearings
must be extended to all juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are sentenced to term-of-years sentences. Section C illustrates that Graham
also requires states to provide rehabilitative prison services to juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Section D provides a brief overview of
Florida’s failed legislative efforts to comply with Graham, discusses
the courts’ role in ensuring compliance with the Supreme Court’s
mandate, and provides guidance for future efforts.

225. Alvarez v. State, 358 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1978) (footnote omitted).
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A. Graham Mandates Parole or Sentencing Review Hearings
Pursuant to Graham, states must provide juvenile nonhomicide
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”226 States need not guarantee juvenile offenders’ eventual freedom, but may not “mak[e] the judgment at the outset that
those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”227 The Graham
Court determined that a life without parole sentence “improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity.”228 The Court explained that the sentence “ ‘means denial of
hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are
immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for
the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the
rest of his days.’ ”229 In addition, the incorrigibility of a juvenile nonhomicide offender cannot be accurately assessed at the outset, and
juveniles are capable of reform.230
It is thus clear that the Graham Court requires states to provide
juvenile nonhomicide offenders with a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation and thereby obtain release
from life imprisonment. In other words, the Court seems to require
the availability of parole.231 Indeed, the “meaningful opportunity”
standard was coined by Graham’s counsel, Mr. Gowdy, in the context
of the availability of parole.232 The standard evolved during oral argument as follows:
Justice Samuel Alito: --If we agree with you, at what point must
the parole consideration be given? There is a suggestion in your
brief that maybe the Colorado statute, which says that a person
226. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (emphasis added).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2029.
229. Id. at 2027 (quoting Naovarath v. State, 779 P.2d 944, 944 (Nev. 1989)).
230. Id. at 2026-27.
231. See, e.g., id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“And what Eighth Amendment
principles will govern review by the parole boards the Court now demands that States
empanel?”); Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he only way the courts can carry out the mandate of the Graham decision
is to ensure that a juvenile offender is eligible for parole or some equivalent of parole.”);
Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Wolf, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only
logical way to address the concerns expressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Graham v. Florida is to provide parole opportunities for juveniles.” (citation omitted));
Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 77 (2012) (stating that
“parole must be available under state law in order to comport with Graham’s
requirements”); Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw Your
Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida Now
Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for a Second Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 68
(2010) (concluding that Graham’s mandate requires states to have “an active parole board
and rehabilitative measures in place”); id. at 74 (suggesting incremental sentencing
reviews by parole boards).
232. See Wallace, supra note 231, at 65-66.
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can get parole consideration after 40 years, would be constitutional. Is that your position?
Mr. Gowdy: Your Honor, our position is that it should be left up
to the States to decide. We think that the -- the Colorado provision
would probably be constitutional. We will have to see what different States do. I mean, but -- but, yes, even that long amount of
time would give at least some hope to the adolescent offender.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts: What about -- what if it’s the -pursuant to the usual State parole system, and it turns out that
grants parole to 1 out of 20 applicants?
Mr. Gowdy: I think all that would have to be required, Your Honor -- I think that would be sufficient. All that would have to be required is a meaningful opportunity to the adolescent offender to
demonstrate that he has in fact changed, reformed, and is now fit
to live in society. It -- that’s all. That’s all we are asking for. We
are not asking that it be automatic right to get back out.233

The Court’s holding, however, does not expressly mandate the availability of parole and instead requires states to devise the method of
compliance.234 This allocation of responsibility was likely due to the
Court’s lack of authority to order states to make parole available.235
Accordingly, Graham permits states to devise alternative methods.236
Nonetheless, aside from sentencing review hearings, it is difficult
to conceive of a viable alternative to parole that would satisfy
Graham’s requirements.
Sentencing review hearings by trial courts could satisfy Graham’s
mandate and constitute an alternative approach. To comply with
Graham’s meaningful opportunity requirement, the hearing would
function much the same way as parole review. Once the offender has
served a certain number of years or a given portion of his sentence, or
reached a specific age, he could be entitled to a sentencing review
hearing by the trial court that imposed the original sentence. The
233. Transcript of Oral Argument, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 087412) (emphasis added), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/
2009_08_7412.
234. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“It is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the
means and mechanisms for compliance.”).
235. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (“There is no ‘constitutional or
inherent right’ to parole . . . .” (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979))).
236. See Gerard Glynn & Ilona Vila, What States Should Do to Provide a Meaningful
Opportunity for Review and Release: Recognize Human Worth and Potential, 24 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 310, 313 (2012) (“[T]here is a clear suggestion that an opportunity for
release will be through parole or resentencing.”); Sally Terry Green, Realistic Opportunity
for Release Equals Rehabilitation: How the States Must Provide Meaningful Opportunity
for Release, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 12 (2011) (“How, therefore, must the juvenile
offender obtain opportunity for release remains the ensuing question. The answer was
intentionally left to the province of the States to develop the ‘means and mechanisms for
compliance.’ ”).
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court’s task would be to determine whether the juvenile offender has
achieved maturity and reform and thus qualifies for release. If the
court finds that the offender has been rehabilitated, the original sentence may be reduced. If the court finds that the offender has not
been reformed, release would be denied and the offender would be
entitled to sentencing review hearings in specific intervals thereafter.
Currently, no alternative methods of compliance—besides parole and
sentencing review hearings—have been proposed. Therefore, pursuant to Graham, states must make parole or sentencing review hearings available to juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving a life sentence in order to provide them with a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate they have been reformed and thus should be granted release.
B. Graham Applies to All Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders’ Term-ofYears Sentences
This Note posits that Graham applies to the term-of-years sentences of juvenile nonhomicide offenders and that the availability of
parole or sentencing review hearings should be extended to all such
sentences. Graham’s holding is applicable to lengthy term-of-yearswithout-parole sentences for the three main reasons discussed in
Part III.237 First, it is illogical to fixate on a strictly literal reading of
Graham’s holding when the Court implicitly rejected a technical
reading of Graham’s sentence and instead focused on its practical
effect.238 Second, the rejection of Graham’s applicability to term-ofyears sentences enables courts to disregard the Supreme Court’s reasoning and to further the evils the Supreme Court sought to prevent;
that is, it permits the disguised imposition of the second-harshest
punishment on an offender whose culpability is diminished by the
characteristics of youth, it lacks sufficient penological justification,
and it deprives the juvenile offender of an opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated reform.239 Third, courts and legislatures
can avoid the line-drawing problems that arise from Graham’s application to term-of-years sentences by extending the availability of parole or sentencing review hearings to all juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
Moreover, the life expectancy approach currently espoused by
those courts that properly deem Graham applicable to term-of-years
sentences fails to comply with Graham, as discussed in Part III.240
The fatal weakness of the life expectancy approach is that it provides
for the possibility of release at a fixed time, sometime before and
however close to the offender’s expected death, irrespective of whether the offender has been reformed. Moreover, the approach forces
237.
238.
239.
240.

See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18, 2020, 2030.
See id. at 2026-27, 2028, 2030, 2032-33.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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sentencing courts to rely on factors they are generally prohibited
from considering, such as race, sex, and age. At the same time, it fails
to account for numerous factors that affect an offender’s actual life
expectancy, such as personal and family medical history, national
origin, and prison conditions. Lastly, the approach enables courts to
circumvent Graham by imposing term-of-years sentences that provide for the possibility of release just before the juvenile offenders’
expected deaths and no opportunity to obtain early release based on
demonstrated reform. Thus, the life expectancy approach is inadequate.
The proper approach is to hold Graham applicable to a juvenile
nonhomicide offender’s term-of-years sentence and to make the parole or sentencing review hearing available regardless of the sentence’s length.241 This approach would prevent courts from circumventing the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that the Eighth
Amendment especially protects juveniles because they are constitutionally different from adults. Significantly, the proposed approach
would ensure compliance with Graham’s mandate that states must
provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated reform. At the same
time, it would obviate the need to rely on the problematic life
expectancy method.
Critics may argue that Graham’s categorical ban is inappropriate
because what is at issue is a challenge to lengthy term-of-yearswithout-parole sentences in general, not to a particular type of sentence.242 However, this argument ignores the fact that these sentences are being challenged as they “appl[y] to an entire class of offenders
who have committed a range of crimes.”243 Thus, comparison of the
punishment’s severity to the crime’s gravity would be fruitless because the challenge does not involve a particular defendant’s sentence, but a whole sentencing practice.244 Accordingly, the categorical
approach is appropriate because it was applied analogously in Graham and is necessary because the proportionality approach would be
unhelpful. Critics may further contend that the proposed approach is
not sufficiently retributive, diminishes deterrence, and might increase the recidivism rate. However, these arguments must fail because, as the Court emphasized, a state need not guarantee a juvenile offender’s eventual release.245 Additionally, given that juvenile
offenders would likely not become eligible for a parole or sentencing
241. See Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J.,
concurring).
242. See Burnell v. State, No. 01-10-00214-CR, 2012 WL 29200, at *8 (Tex. App. Jan. 5,
2012).
243. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
244. See id. at 2023.
245. See id. at 2030.
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review hearing for a considerable number of years,246 the proposed
approach would not affect shorter term-of-years sentences.
C. Graham Mandates Rehabilitative Prison Services
In addition to mandating the availability of parole or sentencing
review hearings, the Court requires provision of rehabilitative prison
services to juvenile nonhomicide offenders.247 Upon concluding that
the penological theory of rehabilitation does not justify the imposition
of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender,
the Graham Court explained:
The penalty forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal. . . .
[D]efendants serving life without parole sentences are often denied
access to vocational training and other rehabilitative services that
are available to other inmates. For juvenile offenders, who are
most in need of and receptive to rehabilitation, the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the sentence all the more evident.248

The Court further stated:
[A] categorical rule gives all juvenile nonhomicide offenders a
chance to demonstrate maturity and reform. The juvenile should
not be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment
and self-recognition of human worth and potential. . . . Life in prison without the possibility of parole gives no chance for fulfillment
outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no
hope. Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which is the
foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before
life's end has little incentive to become a responsible individual. In
some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes complicit in the
lack of development. As noted above, it is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and rehabilitation programs
for those who are ineligible for parole consideration. A categorical
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders
avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that
led to an offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.249

Therefore, the Court recognized that juveniles are not only “receptive” to rehabilitation, but are also the “most in need” of such services.250 Indeed, the opinion’s language indicates that the Court prohibits life without parole sentences in part to ensure that juveniles

246. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030; Drinan, supra note 231, at 78; Green, supra note
236, at 12; Wallace, supra note 231, at 67-68.
248. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (internal citations omitted).
249. Id. at 2032-33 (internal citation omitted).
250. Id. at 2030.
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have the opportunity to achieve “maturity and reform,”251 a goal that
is undermined by prison policies that withhold rehabilitative services.252 Moreover, if states were not required to provide rehabilitative services to incarcerated juvenile offenders, the opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated reform would be meaningless;
offenders would lack any realistic chance to achieve the requisite reform, especially in light of the prison environment, which is inherently counterproductive to the rehabilitative ideal.253 Therefore, Graham
must entail “opportunity, while incarcerated, to develop emotionally,
socially, and psychologically.”254 This requirement poses additional
burdens on states, such as Florida, that do not permit juveniles serving lengthy sentences to participate in “rehabilitative, educational, or
vocational programs because there is either no release date or a release date beyond the life expectancy of the child,”255 as well as on
states, such as California, where “prison security classifications prevent juveniles from accessing vocational and other rehabilitative services.”256 These states must take immediate legislative action to ensure that rehabilitative prison services are available to juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
D. Efforts to Comply With Graham
1. Florida’s Failed Legislative Attempts
Compliance with Graham has proven especially troublesome for
the sixteen states and the federal government that have entirely
abolished parole and for the four states that have abolished parole for
certain violent offenses.257 Florida is an excellent example of a state
where reform is desperately needed and legislative efforts have
251. See id. at 2032.
252. See id. at 2032-33.
253. As Sally Terry Green explains, compliance with Graham requires states to provide
“sufficient opportunity for personal development. Otherwise, the opportunity for personal
growth will effectively become a non-opportunity as incarcerated juveniles learn to become
seasoned criminals while subjected to the highly criminogenic adult prison culture.” Green,
supra note 236, at 12; see also Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 340 (discussing juveniles’
development in prison systems in a section entitled “The State’s Role in Preventing
Development”).
254. Green, supra note 236, at 18. Green also argues for an amendment to the states’
sentencing statutes so as to make rehabilitation a primary goal, id. at 22-23, enactment of
sentencing statutes that authorize trial courts to “prescribe treatment options,” id. at 24,
and the development of an alternative prison release model “that focuses on substantive
rehabilitation,” id. at 30.
255. Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 340; see also Drinan, supra note 231, at 78-82.
256. Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 341 (quoting Brief for Sentencing Project as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)
(Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621), 2009 WL 2219303, at *12).
257. See Drinan, supra note 231, at 77; Glynn & Vila, supra note 236, at 324-25;
Reentry Trends in the U.S.: Releases from State Prison, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/reentry/releases.cfm (last visited July 7, 2013).
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failed.258 In Florida, a child may be tried and sentenced as an adult
pursuant to three types of waivers: voluntary, involuntary discretionary, and involuntary mandatory.259 Florida has long abolished its
parole system, although it continues to maintain a functioning Parole
Commission to review sentences that were imposed for offenses that
had been committed prior to specific dates.260 Aside from those rare
instances, an offender’s sentence may be shortened only by incentive
and meritorious gaintime, and even so, the offender must serve at
least eighty-five percent of his sentence.261 Pursuant to Graham,
Florida’s sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment.262 In
response, the Florida Legislature has been attempting to pass
corrective legislation.
In 2011, the Florida House and Senate introduced bills, known as
the Graham Compliance Act, which provided juvenile nonhomicide
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with the opportunity for
parole.263 Specifically, under the bills an offender is eligible for an
initial parole interview if he or she has served twenty-five years in
prison and has had no approved disciplinary reports in the preceding
three years.264 The Parole Commission is required to consider
numerous factors in determining whether the offender “has
demonstrated maturity and reform while in . . . custody” and
therefore should be granted parole.265 An offender who is not granted
258. See Maggie Lee, Florida Struggles with Youth Life Sentences, JUV. JUST. INFO.
EXCHANGE (July 30, 2012), http://jjie.org/florida-struggles-youth-life-sentences/90589
(“Florida has more Graham cases than in [sic] any other state.”).
259. FLA. STAT. § 985.556 (2012). Voluntary waiver occurs when the child, together
with his or her parent or guardian, “demands in writing to be tried as an adult.” Id. On the
other hand, pursuant to involuntary discretionary waiver a “state attorney may file a
motion requesting the court to transfer the child for criminal prosecution if the child was
[fourteen] years” old or older at the time of the alleged offense. Id. Lastly, involuntary
mandatory waiver requires that a “state attorney shall request the court to transfer and
certify the child for prosecution as an adult or shall provide written reasons to the court for
not making such request” if (a) the child was fourteen years or older, has been adjudicated
delinquent on one of the enumerated felony offenses, and the current charge is “a second or
subsequent violent crime against a person,” or (b) “the child was [fourteen] years of age or
older at the time of commission of a fourth or subsequent alleged felony offense and the
child was previously adjudicated delinquent or had adjudication withheld for or was found
to have committed, or to have attempted or conspired to commit, three offenses that are
felony offenses if committed by an adult, and one or more of such felony offenses involved
the use or possession of a firearm or violence against a person.” Id.
260. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Parole, FLA. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/inmates/parole.html (last visited July 7, 2013).
261. § 921.002(1)(e).
262. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
263. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011).
264. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011).
265. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011). These factors are: “1. The wishes of the
victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. 2. Whether the juvenile offender was a
relatively minor participant in the criminal offense or acted under extreme duress or
domination of another person. 3. Whether the juvenile offender has shown sincere and
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parole at the initial interview is eligible for an interview every seven
years thereafter, provided he or she does not have any approved
disciplinary reports in the past three years.266 Both bills failed.267
Although the Act was endorsed by the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys
Association, some legislators outright opposed the revival of parole.268
Child advocates also criticized the Act and argued that parole
eligibility within ten or fifteen years would be more appropriate
because by then juvenile offenders become “fully mature adult[s]”;
moreover, they deemed the twenty-five-year criterion inappropriate
because it used to be the standard for adult murderers.269 Similarly,
the Act has been criticized on the ground that the twenty-five-year
eligibility criterion “strains the ‘spirit’ ” of Graham because it ignores
the possibility that rehabilitation may be achieved long before the
expiration of that period.270 This Note suggests that while juveniles
may indeed be rehabilitated before the twenty-five-year period
expires, it is within the states’ discretion to impose such a
requirement. Moreover, the juveniles in question are convicted of
violent, often heinous crimes. Mandating the opportunity for juveniles to demonstrate rehabilitation from the outset in order to obtain
release would place the rehabilitative penological theory above all
others, in contravention to the current trend.271
sustained remorse for the criminal offense. 4. Whether the juvenile offender’s age,
maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense affected her or his
behavior. 5. Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody of the department, has
aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical, mental, or physical
conditions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other inmates. 6. Whether
the juvenile offender has successfully completed any General Educational Development,
other educational, technical, work, vocational, or available self-rehabilitation program. 7.
Whether the juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse prior to
the time of the offense. 8. The results of any mental health assessment or evaluation that
has been performed on the juvenile offender.” Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011).
266. Fla. HB 29 (2011); Fla. SB 160 (2011).
267. HB 29 – Parole for Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44803 (House Bill 29
died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 7, 2011); SB 160 – Parole for Juvenile
Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/
Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=44816 (Senate Bill 160 died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 9, 2011).
268. Jeff Kunerth, ‘Graham Law’ Would Replace Life Without Parole for Juveniles,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 12, 2011), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-0412/features/os-life-without-parole-graham-20110412_1_terrance-graham-parole-juveniles.
269. Id.; see also Sheldon Gardner, Teen Sentences Pose Challenge, THE ST. AUGUSTINE
REC. (Aug. 1, 2011, 12:31 AM), http://staugustine.com/news/local-news/2011-07-31/teensentences-pose-challenge. Florida State University Clinical Law Professor Paolo Annino
asserts that the twenty-five-year waiting period is unnecessarily long because a fifteenyear-old juvenile offender “has developed psychologically” by the age of twenty-five. See id.
270. Green, supra note 236, at 39.
271. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2013) (“The Legislature finds and
declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”); FLA. STAT.
§ 921.002(1)(b) (2012) (“The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.
Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal
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In 2012, the Florida House and Senate introduced bills identical to
the aforementioned 2011 bills.272 The House bill eventually had a
committee substitute, which provided that “a juvenile offender who is
sentenced to life imprisonment for a nonhomicide offense may be eligible for resentencing” if he or she has served twenty-five years and
has no “approved disciplinary reports for at least [three] years before
the scheduled resentencing hearing.”273 “In determining whether a
juvenile offender has demonstrated maturity and reform and whether she or he should be resentenced,” the court must consider a number of factors.274 “If the court determines . . . that the juvenile offender can reasonably be believed to be fit to reenter society, the court
must issue an order modifying the sentence imposed and placing the
offender on probation for a term of at least [five] years.”275 A juvenile
offender who is not resentenced at the initial resentencing hearing is
eligible for a resentencing hearing every seven years thereafter.276
The Senate bill likewise had a committee substitute, which permitted
a juvenile offender to petition the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the original sentence upon finding the offender “has been sufficiently rehabilitated.”277 To be eligible for a sentencing hearing, the
juvenile offender must be “sentenced to a single or cumulative term
of imprisonment of [ten] or more years for one or more nonhomicide
offenses committed while she or he was [seventeen] years of age or
younger”; be at least twenty-five years old; have successfully comof punishment.”); 204 PA. CODE § 303.11 (2012) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing . . . establishes a sentencing system with a primary focus on retribution, but
one in which the recommendations allow for the fulfillment of other sentencing purposes
including rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation.”).
272. Fla. HB 5 (2012); Fla. SB 92 (2012).
273. Fla. CS for HB 5 (2012).
274. Id. These factors are: “(A) Whether the juvenile offender remains at the same level
of risk to society as she or he had at the time of the initial sentencing. (B) The wishes of the
victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. The absence of the victim or victim’s next
of kin from the resentencing hearing may not be a factor . . . . (C) Whether the juvenile
offender was a relatively minor participant in the criminal offense or acted under extreme
duress or domination of another person. (D) Whether the juvenile offender has shown sincere and sustained remorse for the criminal offense. (E) Whether the juvenile offender’s
age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the offense affected her or his
behavior. (F) Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody of the Department, has
aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical, mental, or physical conditions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other inmates. (G) Whether the
juvenile offender has successfully completed any general educational development or other
educational, technical, work, vocational, or self-rehabilitation program. (H) Whether the
juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional abuse before she or he
committed the offense. (I) The results of any mental health assessment, risk assessment, or
evaluation of the juvenile offender. (J) The facts and circumstances of the offense for which
the life sentence was imposed, including the severity of the offense. (K) Any factor that the
sentencing court may have taken into account at the initial sentencing hearing . . . .” Id.
275. Id. If the offender violates the terms of probation, the court may revoke probation,
and the juvenile becomes ineligible for a resentencing hearing. Id.
276. Id.
277. Fla. CS for SB 92 (2012).
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pleted the GED program, unless the requirement has been waived;
and have no disciplinary reports for at least three years prior to the
petition.278 In determining whether the offender has been sufficiently
rehabilitated, the court must consider a number of factors.279 If the
court suspends or reduces the offender’s sentence, the offender must
participate “in any available reentry program for [two] years upon
release.”280 If the court does not reduce or suspend the sentence, the
offender may petition the court for a sentencing hearing every seven
years thereafter.281 Both bills failed.282
Each chamber introduced an additional bill in 2012.283 The House
bill, known as the Second Chance for Children Act, was identical to
the committee substitute for Senate Bill 92.284 The Senate bill, known
as the Graham Compliance Act, makes a resentencing hearing in the
court of original jurisdiction available to a juvenile nonhomicide offender sentenced to life imprisonment, provided that the offender has
served at least twenty-five years of the sentence and has had no approved disciplinary reports in the three years prior to the hearing.285
Taking into consideration numerous factors, the court is required to
determine whether the offender has “demonstrated maturity and re-

278. Id.
279. Id. These factors are: “1. The juvenile offender’s age, maturity, and psychological
development at the time of the offense or offenses. 2. Any physical, sexual, or emotional
abuse of the juvenile offender before the commission of the offense or offenses. 3. Any
showing of insufficient adult support or supervision of the juvenile offender before the
offense or offenses. 4. Whether the juvenile offender was a principal or an accomplice, was
a relatively minor participant, or acted under extreme duress or domination by another
person. 5. The wishes of the victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. 6. The results
of any available psychological evaluation administered by a mental health professional as
ordered by the court before the sentencing hearing. 7. Any showing of sincere and
sustained remorse by the juvenile offender for the offense or offenses. 8. The juvenile
offender’s behavior while in the custody of the Department including disciplinary reports.
9. Whether the juvenile offender has successfully completed or participated in educational,
technical, or vocational programs and any available self-rehabilitation programs while in
the custody of the department. 10. Any showing by the juvenile offender of a post-release
plan including, but not limited to, contacts made with transitional organizations, faith- and
character-based organizations, or other reentry service programs. 11. Any other factor
relevant to the juvenile offender’s rehabilitation while in the custody of the Department.”
Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. CS/HB 5 – Juvenile Offenders, F LA . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47008 (House Bill 5
died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on March 9, 2012); CS/SB 92 – Reducing or
Suspending the Sentence of a Juvenile Offender, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47114 (Senate Bill 92
died in the Budget Subcommittee on Criminal and Civil Justice Appropriations on March
9, 2012).
283. Fla. HB 635 (2012); Fla. CS for SB 212 (2012).
284. Fla. HB 635 (2012).
285. Fla. CS for SB 212 (2012).
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form” and therefore should be resentenced.286 If the court determines
that the offender “can reasonably be believed to be fit to reenter society,” it must modify the original sentence and place the offender on
probation for at least five years.287 If the offender violates the “conditions of . . . probation, the court may revoke probation and impose
any sentence” it could have originally imposed; the offender is not
eligible for further resentencing hearings.288 A juvenile offender who
is not resentenced at the initial hearing is eligible for a resentencing
hearing every seven years thereafter.289 These bills likewise failed,290
leaving Florida without a mechanism to comply with Graham’s
constitutional mandate.291

286. Id. These factors are: “(A) Whether the juvenile offender poses the same level of
risk to society as at the time of initial sentencing. (B) The wishes of the victim or the opinions of the victim’s next of kin. The absence of the victim or victim’s next of kin from the
resentencing hearing may not be a factor in the court’s determination under this section.
(C) Whether the juvenile offender was a relatively minor participant in the criminal offense
or acted under extreme duress or domination of another person. (D) Whether the juvenile
offender has shown sincere and sustained remorse for the criminal offense. (E) Whether
the juvenile offender’s age, maturity, and psychological development at the time of the
offense affected her or his behavior. (F) Whether the juvenile offender, while in the custody
of the Department, has aided inmates suffering from catastrophic or terminal medical,
mental, or physical conditions or has prevented risk or injury to staff, citizens, or other
inmates. (G) Whether the juvenile offender has successfully completed any General Educational Development or other educational, technical, work, vocational, or self-rehabilitation
program. (H) Whether the juvenile offender was a victim of sexual, physical, or emotional
abuse before she or he committed the offense. (I) The results of any mental health assessment, risk assessment, or evaluation of the juvenile offender. (J) The facts and circumstances of the offense for which the life sentence was imposed, including the severity of the
offense. (K) Any factor that the sentencing court may have taken into account at the initial
sentencing hearing in relation to all other considerations listed in this section which may
be relevant to the court’s determination.” Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. HB 635 – Reducing or Suspending the Sentence of a Juvenile Offender, FLA.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.
aspx?BillId=47855 (House Bill 635 died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on March 9,
2012); CS/SB 212 – Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=47205 (Senate Bill
212 died on Calendar on March 9, 2012).
291. The 2013 proposals also failed. See HB 963 – Juvenile Sentencing, FLA. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=
50222 (House Bill 963 died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 3, 2013); SB 998
– Juvenile Offenders, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=50136& (Senate Bill 998 died in the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee on May 3, 2013); Fla. HB 963 (2013); Fla. SB 998 (2013) (proposing that a
juvenile offender sentenced to life imprisonment for nonhomicide offenses shall be eligible
for resentencing after serving fifteen years; a juvenile offender sentenced to life for homicide offenses, sexual offenses, or attempted murder offenses be eligible for resentencing
after serving twenty-five years; if the juvenile is deemed “rehabilitated and is reasonably
believed to be fit to reenter society,” he or she shall be placed on probation for at least five
years; and a juvenile who is denied resentencing shall be eligible for a hearing every five
years thereafter); Fla. CS for HB 7137 (2013); Fla. CS for SB 1350 (2013).
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Unlike Florida, a few states have successfully taken initial steps
toward compliance with Graham. For example, California recently
enacted a bill that allows a juvenile offender who has served at least
fifteen years of a life without parole sentence to submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing, provided the offender did not torture the victim and the victim was not a public
safety official.292 If the sentence is not recalled, the offender may
submit a second petition upon having served at least twenty years; if
that petition is denied, the offender may submit a third petition after
serving twenty-four years.293 The offender may submit a final petition
during the twenty-fifth year of his sentence.294 The Iowa legislature
also enacted a bill that makes parole available to juvenile offenders
who are not convicted of first-degree murder and who have served a
minimum of twenty-five years in prison.295 Similarly, Louisiana now
provides for parole eligibility to juvenile offenders sentenced to life
imprisonment, provided they are not serving life for first-degree
murder or second-degree murder, have served thirty years, and meet
certain enumerated criteria.296
2. Suggested Response to Failed Legislative Attempts and
Guidance for Future Efforts
It is up to state legislatures to create mechanisms that ensure
compliance with Graham; policy-making authority is properly reserved to the legislative branch, which includes the power to establish the availability of parole or sentencing review hearings.297 However, in light of the legislature’s failure to devise a corrective mechanism, courts are forced into an untenable position.298 Must courts sit
292. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (West 2013).
293. Id. § 1170(d)(2)(H).
294. Id.
295. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (2011).
296. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 574.4(D) (2012).
297. See Gridine v. State, 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Wolf, J., dissenting)
(“The Legislature, not the judiciary, is empowered to create a provision for parole.”); Floyd
v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“[W]e encourage the Legislature to follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance in Graham and to ‘explore the means and mechanisms for
compliance’ of its opinion.”); Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“This
Court lacks the authority to craft a solution to this problem. We encourage the Legislature
to consider modifying Florida’s current sentencing scheme to include a mechanism for
review of juvenile offenders sentenced as adults as discussed in Graham.”).
298. See Washington v. State, 103 So. 3d 917, 920-22 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Wolf, J.,
concurring) (discussing and rejecting the proposed solutions involving parole to achieve
compliance with Miller v. Alabama and concluding that a term-of-years-without-parole
sentence is the court’s only viable solution); Gardner, supra note 269 (discussing the
variety of sentences juvenile offenders have received on Graham resentencing and
legislative proposals in Florida to address the issue); Elaine Silvestrini, Courts Grappling
with Juveniles’ Life Sentences, TAMPA TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2012), http://tbo.com/news/crime/
courts-grappling-with-juveniles-life-sentences-481011 (describing the uncertainties courts
and attorneys are facing in Florida and the various proposed approaches).
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back and wait for a legislative solution in an effort to abide by the
separation of powers doctrine? Or should they develop a solution in
light of the unconstitutional sentences juveniles are serving and the
uncertainties attorneys and lower courts are facing?
This Note suggests that in light of the prolonged absence of corrective legislation, courts should ensure compliance with the Supreme
Court’s mandate. Specifically, courts should declare unconstitutional
statutory provisions that prevent compliance with the Graham
Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Judge Padovano of
the First District Court of Appeal of Florida supports this approach:
Although legislative action would have been preferable, it is not
absolutely necessary. If parole is the only effective solution to the
constitutional deficiency identified in Graham, and I believe that it
is, the court can cure the deficiency by addressing the constitutional validity of the statute that places a limitation on the eligibility for parole.299

Accordingly, Judge Padovano concluded that “the only lawful remedy
is to declare unconstitutional section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, to
the extent that it applies to a juvenile offender sentenced as an adult.
This would have the effect of making these offenders eligible for parole under the existing parole system.”300 This approach does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, for it is the duty of the courts
to interpret and ensure the constitutionality of laws. Ample time has
elapsed since the Supreme Court handed down Graham, and the legislature continuously fails to resolve this significant matter even after repeated pleas by desperate courts. If the legislature disapproves
of the courts’ solution, it will have a greater incentive to act.
Nevertheless, this approach is an incomplete solution. After a
court strikes down a statutory provision that prevents compliance
with Graham, sentencing courts and juvenile offenders continue to
remain without an alternative. To actually resolve the problem, the
court would have to specify the eligibility criteria for the parole or
sentencing review hearing and devise guidelines for the entire pro-

299. Smith v. State, 93 So. 3d 371, 376 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Padovano, J., concurring);
see also id. (explaining that under Florida’s current system judges do not have sufficient
authority to determine whether a juvenile offender has been rehabilitated, and, in any
event, would be powerless to provide the offender with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain
release” (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010))); State v. Shaffer, 77 So.
3d 939, 942-43 (La. 2011) (striking down statutory provisions that precluded parole
eligibility in order to achieve compliance with Graham). But see In re Diaz, 170 Wash. App.
1039, at *7 n.6 (Sept. 18, 2012) (unpublished) (refusing to address a juvenile nonhomicide
offender’s Graham challenge to his 1,111-month sentence on the ground that “only the
legislature has the authority to amend the [Sentencing Reform Act] to allow for such remedy, and only the executive branch can implement it”).
300. Smith, 93 So. 3d at 375 (Padovano, J., concurring). The concurrence emphasized
that Florida still has a functioning Parole Commission. Id. at 376-77.
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cess—this is beyond the court’s power. Thus, the need for legislative
action is inevitable.
Lastly, this Note offers some general guidance for future legislative efforts. While the provision of sentencing review hearings is a
viable alternative to parole,301 it remains to be seen which is the superior mechanism. Compared to parole, sentencing review hearings
may be more burdensome procedurally and economically, and the
outcomes more inconsistent given the lack of centralized review.302
Additionally, while parole boards are already criticized for rarely approving parole,303 sentencing review hearings may further reduce the
chance of release because an individual judge may be even more risk
averse given that any future harm caused by a released offender
would rest on his or her shoulders alone. However, the parole system
is fraught with problems. For example, during parole hearings juvenile offenders do not have a constitutional right to counsel, and “parole boards routinely consider exceptionally unreliable evidence like
unsubstantiated rumors.”304 Moreover, unlike the decisionmakers on
parole boards, “all trial judges are experienced in assessing the
weight of evidence, facilitating the adversarial truth-finding process,
and remaining objective.”305 “Because political connections are often
the main prerequisite for appointment to a parole board, and because
the process of parole is largely invisible to the public, there is a risk
that the parole board might be susceptible to political pressure.”306
Therefore, while further discussion is beyond the scope of this Note,
it would be worth examining which mechanism is the more effective
method of complying with Graham.
301. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
302. See Michelle Marquis, Note, Graham v. Florida: A Game-Changing Victory for
Both Juveniles and Juvenile-Rights Advocates, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 255, 283-84 (2011)
(stating that the “solution” of resentencing hearings “is fraught with difficulties and carries
with it the significant risk that juveniles across the country will face widely disparate sentences for identical crimes”).
303. See id at 286-87. “[C]ritics have questioned how meaningful the right to a parole
hearing actually is, given that in many states, ‘parole hearings have become a sort of
charade in which the prisoner can never actually win release, because the parole board
routinely denies parole eligibility based solely upon the facts of the underlying crime,
which is the one thing that the prisoner . . . can never change.’ ” Id. at 286 (quoting Jean
Casella & James Ridgeway, Supreme Court Decision Limits Juvenile Life Without Parole
(Within Limits), SOLITARY WATCH (May 17, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/05/17/
supreme-court-limits-juvenile-life-without-parole-but-the-limits-have-their-limits/). There
is an “illusory existence of ‘meaningful’ parole release,” as demonstrated by statistics of
discretionary parole releases across the nation, such as the fact that in California only one
percent of parole-eligible offenders are released. Id. at 287.
304. Pari McGarraugh, Note, Up Or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk
Assessment Is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1079, 1085, 1087 (2013) (internal quotation omitted).
305. Id. at 1089 (footnotes omitted).
306. Id. at 1089-90 (internal citations and quotation omitted) (quoting a parole board
member as saying, “If the governor likes you, you might get to keep your job,” and noting
that the requirements for becoming parole board members are generally low).
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Lastly, the better approach seems to be to tie parole or sentencing
review eligibility to the number of years served, not to chronological
age. While using age as an eligibility criterion is an arguably logical
approach because it is correlated with maturity and reform, it has
the perverse effect of ensuring that a younger and presumptively less
culpable offender serves more time in prison than an older offender
before having the opportunity to demonstrate reform. Moreover, the
age criterion seems to place the rehabilitative ideal above all other
penological goals.307
V. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the Graham Court’s mandate that states must provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment
with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,”308 states must make parole or
sentencing review hearings available. Moreover, Graham applies to
lengthy term-of-years sentences; accordingly, states should make parole or sentencing review hearings available to all juvenile nonhomicide offenders, regardless of the length of sentence, because the life
expectancy approach is inadequate. In addition, Graham requires
states to make rehabilitative prison services available to all juvenile
nonhomicide offenders in order to provide them with a realistic opportunity to achieve the requisite reform. The proposed approach ensures that courts fully comply with Graham and do not circumvent
the Court’s mandate and thereby violate the Eighth Amendment.
Nevertheless, states retain the necessary discretion to confine deserving juvenile offenders behind bars for life.

307. See discussion supra Part IV.D.
308. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).

